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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
STATE OF GEORGIA, Ex. ReI. 
RALPH HUDGINS, Georgia Insurance 
Commissioner, as Liquidator of the 
Estate of SOUTHERN CASUALTY 
INSURANCE CO., A Georgia Insurer, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD O'DOM, et aI. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil Action File No. 
) 2015CV258501 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants seeking dismissal of 
the various claims against them. Upon consideration of the motions, briefs, and oral arguments, 
the Court finds as follows: 
I. ALLEGATIONS 
Southern Casualty Insurance Company ("SCIC") was an automobile insurer. On March 
20, 2013, pursuant to a Consent of Liquidation Order ("Liquidation Order"), SCIC was declared 
insolvent and Ralph T. Hudgens, the Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Georgia (the 
"Commissioner") was appointed Liquidator ofSCIC's estate. 
The Commissioner brought this action on behalf of SCIC's policyholders and creditors 
against two groups of defendants: the "Management Defendants" and the "Financing 
Defendants." The Management Defendants include Defendants Richard O'Dom, Key Claims 
Services Corporation ("Key Claims"), John Robinson, Willard Peacock, Wesley Sivley, and 
Clifford Olsen. The individual Management Defendants served as officers and/or directors of 
scrc at various times, and Key Claims oversaw claims management functions at scrc. The 
Management Defendants face claims of breach of fiduciary duty (Count 1), negligence (Count 
2), negligent misrepresentation (Count 3), and deepening insolvency (Count 10). 
The Financing Defendants include Defendants First NBC Bank, First NBC Holding 
Company (collectively as "First NBC"), Ashton J. Ryan, Key Insurance Network, Inc. ("Key 
Network"), O'Dom, and Olsen. Each of the Financing Defendants either made loans to scrc or 
made investments in scrc through Key Holdings and its affiliates. I The Financing Defendants 
face claims of negligence (Count 6), aiding and abetting the Management Defendants' breaches 
of fiduciary duty (Count 9), and deepening insolvency (Count 10). The Commissioner also 
raises a claim of fraudulent transfer against First NBC, Ryan, and Olsen (Count 7) and a claim of 
negligence in connection with a $7 million transfer against O'Dom (Count 8)_2 
scrc was acquired on or about May 30, 2007, by non-party Key Holdings. Key 
Holdings' acquisition of scrc was financed by an $8 million personal loan to Defendant O'Dom 
from Defendant First NBC. The $8 million was to be used by O'Dom to purchase 100% of the 
Key Holdings stock. The loan was in part personally guaranteed by O'Dom and as a part of the 
loan transaction, First NBC would receive security interest in 1000 shares of Key Holdings 
Common Stock, representing 100% of the Key Holdings stock. Also, under the terms of the 
loan, scrc would maintain a $7 million capital account and no dividends or distributions would 
be made without prior approval of First NBC; First NBC would require approval of the terms of 
all key outsourcing contracts; and no change of ownership in subsidiaries could be made without 
I Key Holdings is not a party to this action. Key Holdings owned 100% of Key Claims and 100% of Key 
Network. Collectively, these entities will be called the "Key Companies." 
2 The Motions to Dismiss were filed on July 17,2015. The Commissioner subsequently filed a Second 
Amended Complaint on September 9, 2015. The Second Amended Complaint added a cause of action 
and limited some of the causes of action to specific defendants only. The Second Amended Complaint is 
the operative complaint. 
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First NBC's prior approval. Ryan, First NBC's CEO, frequently received detailed reports 
regarding SCIC's operations. 
As early as May 30, 2008, SCIC's statutory accountants began reporting deficiencies in 
SCIC's internal control, including a lack of effective controls to safeguard assets. On May 27, 
2010, SCIC's independent accountant, Porter Keadle Moore, LLP, issued a report on its audit of 
SCIC's financial statements as of December 31,2009. The report concluded that SCIC had 
incurred a substantial net loss in 2009 and had negative cash flow from operations for each of the 
past two years. The report noted declines in SCIC's capital and surplus they were statutorily 
obligated to maintain. Based on SCIC's poor financial performance, the Commissioner placed 
SCIC under administrative supervision on September 29,2010. In 2011, Porter Keadle Moore 
audited SCIC's 2010 financials and again expressed substantial doubt about SCIC's ability to 
continue as a going concern. Despite these concerns, Financial Defendants continued to make 
loans to SCIC through O'Dom, Key Network, and Key Holdings in order to maintain statutorily 
required surplus levels. 
Despite SCIC's poor financial performance, First NBC loaned an additional $7 million to 
SCIC through a series of complex transactions. The loan was made to Olsen who used the 
money to purchase Key Holdings stock. Key Holdings was to use the money to purchase SCIC 
preferred stock. Olsen signed a Promissory Note for the $7 million on November 8,2012. The 
money was deposited into Key Holding's account on November 26,2012.3 Though the money 
was disbursed by First NBC for "Investment in the Capital Account of SCIC," the money was 
ultimately transferred back to First NBC and Olsen on December 1 0, 2012. On March 20, 2013, 
SCIC was declared insolvent and was liquidated by the Commissioner. 
3 Defendants vigorously disputed these and other alleged facts at the June 6, 2016 hearing, but given the posture of 
the case, the Court will accept the facts as pleaded by the Commissioner for purposes of these Motions. 
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The Commissioner as Liquidator alleges the Management Defendants: engaged in 
operational decisions without utilizing sound insurance business management practices; 
misrepresented SCIC's financial status to its regulator, policyholders and creditors; hired 
incompetent and unqualified employees to calculate critical items contained in SCIC's financial 
filings; and knew or should have known that these actions were financially detrimental to SCIC, 
among other things. Plaintiff alleges the Management Defendants' acts and omissions caused 
andlor contributed to the ultimate insolvency of SCIC, which resulted in the loss of coverage and 
benefits to policyholders and claimants as well as damages to SCIC's creditors. 
The Commissioner alleges the Financing Defendants continued to provide financial 
support to SCIC through Key Holdings, Key Network, and non-party Key Claims (collectively, 
the "Key Companies") as "straw man" entities despite being aware of SCIC's financial 
shortcomings. The Commissioner claims the loans were structured using these "straw man" 
entities so that SCIC could maintain statutorily-required surplus levels without having to book 
the loans as liabilities. The Second Amended Complaint alleges the Financing Defendants were 
in a joint enterprise, principal agency relationship, andlor de facto partnership with the 
Management Defendants and the Key Companies were alter egos of SCIC. 
II. ST ANDARD 
"[AJ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint 
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof, and (2) the movant establishes 
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of 
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought ... In deciding a 
motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party 
who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the 
filing party's favor." 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 238 Ga. 72, 73 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Flake, 267 
Ga. 498, 501 (1997)); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). 
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Under the notice pleading procedure of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, only a short and 
plain statement of the claim is required. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(A). Nevertheless, "a 
complaint must give a defendant notice of the claim in tenus sufficiently clear to enable him to 
frame a responsive pleading thereto." Patrick v. Verizon Directories Corp., 284 Ga. App. 123, 
124 (2007) (quoting Allen v. Bergman, 201 Ga. App. 781, 783(3)(b) (1991)). 
III. Defendants O'Dom, Key Network, Key Claims, Robinson, and Peacock's 
Motion to Dismiss 
The moving Defendants argue all claims against them should be dismissed, or at a 
minimum a more definite statement should be required, because the Second Amended Complaint 
is a shotgun pleading. See Bush v. Bank of New York Mellon, 313 Ga. App. 84, 90-91 (2011) 
(noting a shotgun complaint often "contains several counts, each one incorporating by reference 
the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation where most of the counts ... contain 
irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions," combines "multiple claims together in one 
count," and buries material allegations "beneath innumerable pages of rambling irrelevancies."). 
However, the Court finds the Second Amended Complaint meets Georgia's liberal notice 
pleading standard and provides enough information to afford Defendants the opportunity to form 
a response. Therefore, the moving Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint as a shotgun pleading is DENIED. 
O'Dom and Key Network move to dismiss Count 7 against the Financing Defendants for 
fraudulent transfer of $7 million for failure to state a claim. The Commissioner claims this 
transfer was fraudulent under Georgia's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act, O.C.G.A. § 
33-37-25(a) and 33-37-20(a)(21).4 However, there is no allegation that O'Dom, Key Network, 
4 O.C.G.A. § 33-37-25(a) states that every transfer made within one year prior to a petition for liquidation, 
if made without fair consideration or with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud either existing or 
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or SCIC ever received or possessed the $7 million. The Amended Complaint filed June 22, 
2015, originally asserted this claim against all Financing Defendants. However, the Second 
Amended Complaint clarified this claim was only brought against First NBC, Ryan, and Olsen- 
not O'Dom or Key Network. Therefore, O'Dom and Key Network's motion to dismiss Count 7 
of the Second Amended Complaint is moot. 
The Second Amended Complaint adds Count 8 against O'Dom alleging negligence in 
connection with the purported fraudulent transfer of $7 million. The Commissioner argues 
O'Dom was negligent for allowing, enabling, and consenting to the return of funds borrowed 
from First NBC by Olsen on behalf of Key Holdings, SCIC's alter ego. The Commissioner 
alleges O'Dom allowed this transfer "in gross derogation of his duties to SCIC," "without fair 
consideration" or with the "intent to hinder, delay or defraud" existing or future creditors of 
SCIC. O'Dom argues that nothing in the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act authorizes 
an action against a non-transferee to recover money which was never in the possession of the 
insurer and this claim is an improper attempt to bootstrap to the statutory fraudulent transfer 
claim. 
The Court finds the Second Amended Complaint states a claim for negligence sufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss. The Second Amended Complaint alleges O'Dom breached his 
duties to SCIC's shareholders as President, CEO, and Director by allowing Key Holdings, a 
purported alter ego of SCIC, to fraudulently transfer $7 million to Olsen and ultimately First 
NBC, causing harm to the shareholders. Whether the Court can disregard the separateness of 
legal entities is a question of fact. See Scott Bros. v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 285, 288(4) (2003). 
Here, the Commissioner alleges Key Holdings and SCIC shared offices, used employees 
future creditors, is fraudulent. O.C.G.A. § 33-37-20(a)(21) authorizes the liquidator to avoid any transfer 
or lien on behalf of shareholders or creditors. 
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interchangeably, had a common controlling shareholder (O'Dom) and officers and directors in 
common, used a credit card issued to Key Holdings for SCIC's business purchases, and 
otherwise failed to observe corporate formalities. As such, the O'Dom's motion to dismiss the 
negligence claim against him in connection with the $7 million transfer is DENIED. 
Next, O'Dom and Key Network seek dismissal of Count 9 for aiding and abetting 
Management Defendants breach of their fiduciary duties. In Georgia, a party may recover under 
the theory of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty "upon proof of the following elements: 
(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the defendant acted to 
procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2) with knowledge 
that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant acted purposely 
and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's wrongful conduct procured a breach 
of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct proximately 
caused damage to the plaintiff." Insight Tech., Inc. v. FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19,25- 
26 (2006). To act without privilege, the defendant must be a stranger to the business 
relationship. Id.; see also Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga. App. 377, 389 (2014). 
The Commissioner alleges O'Dom and Key Network, to the extent they did not breach 
their own fiduciary duties through their own actions as Management Defendants, aided and 
abetted breaches of the other Management Defendants' fiduciary duties to SCIC by "continuing 
to finance SCIC despite knowledge of the continuing breaches of fiduciary duties by 
Management, propping up SCIC's reported financial position and permitted SCIC to undertake 
additional policyholder obligations when the First NBC and Ryan knew or should have known 
that SCIC was seriously financially troubled, and influencing SCIC's management and 
operations policies." There are no allegations that either Key Network or O'Dom is a stranger to 
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the fiduciary relationship between SCIC and the other Management Defendants who allegedly 
breached their fiduciary duties. Instead, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that O'Dom, at 
all times relevant to the Complaint, was CEO and Director of SCIC and was President from 
SCIC's founding through June of2009 and again from September 2010 through the date of 
Liquidation. O'Dom also served as President ofthe Key Companies for the same time periods. 
The Second Amended Complaint alleges "O'Dom was the controlling shareholder of Key 
Holdings, SCIC, Key Network and Key Claims and dominated the affairs of all the 
corporations." Key Network is alleged to be the managing general agent of SCIC. Further, the 
Commissioner has alleged a unity of interest between O'Dom, SCIC, and the Key Companies 
"such that any individuality and separateness between and among these Defendants, SCIC, and 
Key Holdings ceased and each was the alter ego of the others." Because the Complaint fails to 
allege the moving Defendants were strangers to the business relationship between SCIC and its 
Management Defendants, acting "without privilege," the O'Dom and Key Network's motion to 
dismiss the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim is GRANTED. 
Finally, all moving Defendants seek dismissal of Count 10 for deepening insolvency. 
Georgia does not recognize a claim for deepening insolvency. While the Commissioner argues 
there is a national trend in recognizing deepening insolvency as a viable tort claim, recent case 
law tends to show the opposite. The Commissioner relies on the Third Circuit Lafferty case to 
argue for a trend in acceptance of deepening insolvency. See Official Comm. Of Unsecured 
Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 349-52 (3rd Cir. 2001) (construing Pennsylvania 
law). However, the Third Circuit recently noted that the deepening insolvency theory adopted by 
"Lafferty is problematic, and at the earliest opportunity its conclusion should be revisited." In re 
Lexington Home/or the Aged v. Arthur Baldwin, et al., 781 F.3d 675. Likewise, the 
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Commissioner relies on a case from the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 
adopting the reasoning of Lafferty and recognizing deepening insolvency as a viable tort claim. 
See Limor v. Burger, 322 B.R. 781, 808 (Bankr. MD. Tenn. 2005). However, four years later, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee refused to recognize a deepening 
insolvency claim on the ground that "the [deepening insolvency] theory is still obscure and 
difficult to distinguish from existing torts, that it duplicates existing legal remedies, and that 
much scholarly and judicial opinion has recently turned against it." In re Propex Inc., 415 B.R. 
321, 331 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009). Where parties have attempted to impose novel or previously 
unrecognized causes of action, Georgia courts have refused to acknowledge them, particularly 
when a full and adequate remedy exists. See, e.g., Owens v. Am. Refuse Sys., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 
780, 781 (2000) (refusing to create separate spoliation tort claim). Here, the Commissioner can 
adequately seek a remedy under the legal theories relied upon in the other Counts. As such, the 
moving Defendants' motion to dismiss Count 10 for deepening insolvency claim against them is 
GRANTED. 
IV. Clifford Olsen's Motion to Dismisss 
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Clifford Olsen ("Olsen") was an SCIC 
director from scrc's formation in 2007 through approximately December of2008 and again 
from September 22,2010 through SC1C's liquidation.? He was also a director of the Key 
Companies for certain time periods. Olsen made several loans to and investments in SCIC 
and/or the Key Companies for the benefit of scrc. Olsen, like O'Dom and Key Network, is 
5 Olsen attached the Administrative Order and his own deposition testimony to his Answer to the Second 
Amended Complaint and alternatively seeks judgment on the pleadings. The Court has not taken his 
deposition testimony into consideration. 
6 The Court will disregard any conflicting evidence regarding Olsen's tenure for purposes of this Motion 
and view the evidence in the light most favorable to and will resolve all doubts in favor of the 
Commissioner. 
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identified as both a "Management Defendant" and a "Financing Defendant." 
First, Olsen argues that claims against him as a Management Defendant are barred as a 
matter of law to the extent that he was acting during the time SCIC was under the 
Commissioner's administrative supervision. Olsen cites a North Carolina case in which the 
Commissioner brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the officers and directors or an 
insurance company as persuasive. See State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622, 2010 WL 1035809 at 
*40 (N.C. Super. Mar. 19,2010). However, the North Carolina case is distinguishable. Notably, 
the Court was ruling on a motion for summary judgment. After considering the evidence, the 
Court found that certain payments made to the insurer's former CEO according to the terms of a 
settlement agreement were lawful and reasonable and were expressly approved by the 
Commissioner's agent. While similar facts may be present in this case, it is not proper for the 
Court to weigh evidence for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. As such, 
these claims are not barred as a matter oflaw by the Commissioner's administrative supervision. 
Olsen argues there are no specific allegations of a breach of his fiduciary duty (Count 1), 
negligence (Count 2), or a negligent misrepresentation (Count 3) during his earlier term as a 
director in 2007 and 2008. However, as the Court has already noted, the pleading must only 
provide a short and plain statement of the claims. Here, the Commissioner has provided 
reasonable notice of the claims sufficient to allow Olsen to respond. 
Next, Olsen seeks dismissal of Count 6 for negligence against him as a Financing 
Defendant, arguing he did not owe SCIC any duty as a lender. However, the Second Amended 
Complaint alleges Olsen owes SCIC a duty of care as a consequence of a principal/agent 
relationship and/or a de facto partnership with SCIC. Olsen allegedly breached his duty to SCIC 
by making loans to obscure SCIC's true financial condition and ongoing viability for his own 
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potential self-gain-a possible ownership interest in SCrC-and to the detriment of scrc 
policyholders and creditors. The Commissioner has adequately pled a valid claim.7 As such, 
Olsen's Motion to Dismiss Count 6 is DENIED. 
Olsen alleges that Count 9 for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty fails as a 
matter oflaw because the Commissioner has not alleged malice or intent to injure and Olsen 
cannot be liable as both a primary wrongdoer and an aider and abetter. However, the 
Commissioner alleged intent in his Second Amended Complaint and clarified that Olsen would 
only be liable under this claim to the extent he did not participate in the act as a Management 
Defendant. As such, Olsen's motion to dismiss Count 9 is DENIED as moot. 
Olsen argues that Count 7 for fraudulent transfer fails as a matter oflaw because Key 
Holdings, and not the insurer, scrc, transferred the $7 million and thus it was not fraudulent 
under the statute applicable to transfers "made or suffered by an insurer" within one year prior to 
the filing of a petition for liquidation. However, the Commissioner alleges that scrc and Key 
Holdings were alter egos. This allegation is enough to survive a motion to dismiss. As such, 
Olsen's motion to dismiss Count 7 is DENIED. 
As noted above, Georgia does not recognize a tort for deepening insolvency. As such, 
Olsen's motion to dismiss Count 10 for deepening insolvency is GRANTED. 
v. Sivley's Motion to Dismiss 
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Wesley T. Sivley ("Sivley") served as 
President, COO, and Director of scrc, Key Holdings, Key Network, and Key Claims from 
September 2009 until June 2010.8 Sivley argues the Complaint is an impermissible shotgun 
7 The Court declines to consider deposition testimony attached to Olsen's Answer to the Second 
Amended Complaint as a part of the pleadings. 
8 The Court must take the allegations in the Complaint as true. However, Sivley acknowledged in his 
Answer that he was an SCIC officer and director until September of 2010. 
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pleading because it does not identify Sivley'S specific failures and does not account for 
intervening actions by the other officers, directors, and the Commissioner as administrative 
supervisor which may have caused SCIC's insolvency. This level of specificity is not required 
under Georgia's liberal pleading standard. Therefore, Sivley's motion to dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading is DENIED. 
Similarly, Sivley argues Count 1 for breach of fiduciary duty fails because the 
Commissioner relies on conclusory allegations and does not allege specific conduct by Sivley. 
However, the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the time frame during which 
Sivley was involved with SCIC management and owed fiduciary duties to SeIC, and has 
sufficiently stated how the Management Defendants breached their duties leading to SCIC's 
insolvency. As such, Sivley's motion to dismiss Count 1 for breach of fiduciary duty is 
DENIED. 
Next, Sivley argues that Count 2 for negligence fails as a matter oflaw. However, the 
Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges Sivley breached the duties he owed to SCIC by 
making management decisions without deliberation, without the requisite diligence to ascertain 
and assess the facts and circumstances upon which the decisions were based, and/or in bad faith. 
As a consequence, SCIC's policyholders and creditors suffered damages. The Commissioner has 
sufficiently alleged facts which would allow Sivley to respond to the negligence claim against 
him. As such, Sivley's motion to dismiss Count 2 for negligence is DENIED. 
Finally, Sivley argues that Count 3 for negligent misrepresentation fails because the 
Commissioner has not identified a misrepresentation made by Sivley. However the Second 
Amended Complaint alleges that each of the Management Defendants made misrepresentations 
regarding reserve levels and losses that were ultimately reported to policyholders and creditors in 
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Quarterly and Annual Statements during the Management Defendants' respective tenures as 
officers and directors. The Commissioner alleges that the selling agents, policyholders, 
creditors, and the Department ofInsurance relied on the misstatements to the detriment of 
SCIC's policyholders and creditors. More specific allegations are not required at the pleading 
stage. As such, Sivley's motion to dismiss Count 3 for negligent misrepresentation is DENIED. 
As noted above, Georgia does not recognize a tort for deepening insolvency. As such, 
Sivley's motion to dismiss Count 10 for deepening insolvency is GRANTED. 
VI. First NBC Bank, First NBC Holding Company, and Ashton J. Ryan's 
Motion to Dismiss 
According to the Second Amended Complaint, First NBC Bank provided a series of loans 
to SCIC and associated entities from SCIC's founding until its Liquidation in March 2013. First 
NBC Bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of First NBC Holding Company and Ashton J. Ryan is 
First NBC Bank's President and CEO (collectively, the "Bank Defendants"). All three parties 
are identified as "Financing Defendants." Plaintiffs allege the Bank Defendants engaged in a 
scheme whereby loans would be provided to various alter egos of SCIC in an effort to allow 
SCIC to maintain statutorily-required surplus levels which it could not have maintained without 
the Bank Defendants' financing. The loans were structured in this way, and were typically not 
provided directly to SCIC, because SCIC would have had to book the loans as liabilities which 
would have an effect on its surplus levels. 
First, Bank Defendants argue the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed 
against Ryan and First NBC Holding because they are both Louisiana residents and the Court 
lacks personal jurisdiction and is the improper venue. Georgia's long arm statute provides 
jurisdiction over non-residents who transact any business within the state. O.C.G.A. § 9-10- 
91 (l). Non-resident corporate employees and officers of a non-resident company can be subject 
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to jurisdiction if they were "primary participants in the activities forming the basis of jurisdiction 
over the corporation." Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 268 (2011), as amended 
on denial of reconsideration (Dec. 8, 2011 ) (citations omitted). "[A] defendant who files a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction has the burden of proving lack of jurisdiction." 
Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 420 (1990). "A motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction must be granted if there are insufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that 
the defendant can be subjected to the court's jurisdiction." Sol Melia, SA v. Brown, 301 Ga. App. 
760, 761 (2009). "When the outcome of the motion depends on unstipulated facts, it must be 
accompanied by supporting affidavits or citations to evidentiary material in the record. Id. 
Further, to the extent that defendant's evidence controverts the allegations of the complaint, 
plaintiff may not rely on mere allegations, but must also submit supporting affidavits or 
documentary evidence. Id. Both parties rely on the allegations in the Complaint (or lack 
thereof) and neither party cites affidavits or other documentary evidence in support of their 
arguments. 
As to Ryan, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The 
Second Amended Complaint alleges Ryan was a primary participant in the alleged wrongdoing 
committed by the Bank Defendants. Ryan arranged the initial $8 million loan from First NBC to 
O'Dom for Key Holdings acquisition of scrc. In exchange, scrc could not make distributions, 
enter into key outsourcing contracts, or change ownership in subsidiaries without First NBC's 
prior approval. First NBC also had a security interest in 1,000 shares of Key Holdings Common 
Stock. Ryan received frequent, regular and highly detailed reports regarding scrc's operations 
and finances and Ryan conducted regular in-person meeting with Management Defendants. 
Ryan was involved in estimating, calculating and evaluating reserves, adjusting journal entries, 
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managing SCIC's investments, and replacing key personnel. The Second Amended Complaint 
alleges O'Dom, Key Holdings, Key Network, Key Claims, First NBC, Ryan, and Olsen 
established a joint enterprise by combining their property or labor in a joint undertaking for 
profit through the operation of SCIC, each acting as an agent for the other. As such, the Bank 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint due to lack of personal 
jurisdiction and improper venue as to Ryan is DENIED. 
As to First NBC Holding, the Commissioner claims that because First NBC Bank is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of First NBC Holding, First NBC Holding was a "primary participant" 
in the actions that form some of the basis of the lawsuit and is thus subject to personal 
jurisdiction. Simply being a parent company of a subsidiary which is accused of misconduct is 
not enough to establish personal jurisdiction in Georgia. See Cobb County v. Jones Group 
PL. C; 218 Ga. App. 149, 151 (1995). However, personal jurisdiction can be proper over a 
parent company if "the parent's control over the subsidiaries' activities is so complete that, the 
subsidiary is, in fact, merely a division or department of the parent." Id. (quoting Coca-Cola Co. 
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F.Supp. 304, 308 (N.D.Ga.1983» (finding no minimum contacts 
because there was no evidence that parent controlled subsidiaries in light of unrebutted affidavits 
by defendants stating they did not do any of the acts listed in Georgia's Long Arm Statute). 
Here, Defendants did not submit affidavits supporting their claim that jurisdiction is lacking over 
First NBC Holding, and as such Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint against First NBC Holding for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue is 
DENIED. 
Next, Bank Defendants argue that Count 6 for negligence and Count 9 for aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty fail as a matter oflaw because SCIC was under the 
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Commissioner's administrative supervision and the Bank Defendants' actions during that time 
were all subject to the supervision, control, and approval of the Commissioner. However, as 
noted above, all that is required for a pleading is that Plaintiffs provide a short and plain 
statement that is adequate to put Defendants on notice of the claims against them. At this stage, 
it is not proper for the Court to weigh evidence for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim. As such, Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 6 and 9 due to the existence 
of an Administrative Order is DENIED. 
Bank Defendants seek dismissal of Count 6 for negligence against them as Financing 
Defendants on the basis that there is no statutory or common law basis for finding that they owed 
SCIC any independent legal duty. However, the Commissioner has amended his Complaint to 
allege that Bank Defendants owed duties to SCIC under the theories of joint enterprise, 
principal-agent, and de facto partnership. As discussed prior, the Court is skeptical of the 
validity of this claim. However, the Commissioner must only demonstrate the claim has been 
adequately pled, and as such, Bank Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 6 for negligence is 
DENIED. 
Bank Defendants allege that Count 7 for Fraudulent Transfer fails as a matter of law 
because Key Holdings is not an alter ego of SCIC and thus cannot qualify as an "insurer" under 
O.C.O.A. § 33-37-25(a), making the statute inapplicable. However, as discussed above, the 
Second Amended Complaint has adequately pled an alter ego theory that alleges Key Holdings is 
an alter ego of SCIC. Under the alter ego theory, the allegedly fraudulent transfer made by Key 
Holdings to Olsen and/or First NBC would be treated as if SCIC had made the transfer to Olsen 
and/or First NBC; Key Holdings would thus be considered an "insurer" for purposes of O.C.O.A. 
§ 33-37-25(a). As such, Bank Defendants motion to dismiss Count 7 for fraudulent transfer is 
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DENIED. 
Bank Defendants argue that Count 9 for aiding and abetting the Management Defendants' 
breach of fiduciary duty should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the 
Commissioner failed to identify any "improper action" or "wrongful conduct" done with malice 
by the Bank Defendants to aid and abet the breach. However, the Commissioner addressed these 
arguments in the Second Amended Complaint rendering the arguments moot. As such, Bank 
Defendants' motion to dismiss Count 9 is DENIED. 
As noted above, Georgia does not recognize a tort for deepening insolvency. As such, 
Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss Count 10 for deepening insolvency is GRANTED. 
In conclusion, an Order dealing with Counts 4 and 5 was entered by the Court on 
September 18,2015. 
SO ORDERED, this 29th day of June, 2016. 
&$?I<.~~ 
The Honorable Melvin K. Westmoreland 
Superior Court of Fulton County - Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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